We explain the quantum structure as due to the presence of two effects, (a) a real change of state of the entity under influence of the measurement and, (b) a lack of knowledge about a deeper deterministic reality of the measurement process. We present a quantum machine, where we can illustrate in a simple way how the quantum structure arises as a consequence of the two mentioned effects. We introduce a parameter that measures the size of the lack of knowledge on the measurement process, and by varying this parameter, we describe a continuous evolution from a quantum structure (maximal lack of knowledge) to a classical structure (zero lack of knowledge). We show that for intermediate values of we find a new type of structure, that is neither quantum nor classical. We apply the model that we have introduced to situations of lack of knowledge about the measurement process appearing in other regions of reality. More specifically we investigate the quantum-like structures that appear in the situation of psychological decision processes, where the subject is influenced during the testing, and forms some of his opinions during the testing process. Our conclusion is that in the light of this explanation, the quantum probabilities are epistemic and not ontological, which means that quantum mechanics is compatible with a determinism of the whole.
The machine that we consider consists of a physical entity S that is a point particle P that can move on the surface of a sphere, denoted surf , with center O and radius 1. The unit-vector v where the particle is located on surf represents the state p v of the particle (see Fig. 1,a) . For each point u ∈ surf , we introduce the following experiment e u . We consider the diametrically opposite point −u, and install a piece of elastic of length 2, such that it is fixed with one of its end-points in u and the other end-point in −u. Once the elastic is installed, the particle P falls from its original place v orthogonally onto the elastic, and sticks on it (Fig 1,b) .
Fig. 1 : A representation of the quantum machine. In (a) the physical entity P is in state pv in the point v, and the elastic corresponding to the experiment eu is installed between the two diametrically opposed points u and −u. In (b) the particle P falls orthogonally onto the elastic and sticks to it. In (c) the elastic breaks and the particle P is pulled towards the point u, such that (d) it arrives at the point u, and the experiment eu gets the outcome o u 1 .
Then the elastic breaks and the particle P , attached to one of the two pieces of the elastic (Fig. 1,c) , moves to one of the two end-points u or −u (Fig. 1,d ). Depending on whether the particle P arrives in u (as in Fig. 1 ) or in −u, we give the outcome o u 1 or o u 2 to e u . In Figure 2 we represent the experimental process connected to e u in the plane where it takes place, and we can easily calculate the probabilities corresponding to the two possible outcomes. In order to do so we remark that the particle P arrives in u when the elastic breaks in a point of the interval L 1 , and arrives in −u when it breaks in a point of the interval L 2 (see Fig. 2 ). We make the hypothesis that the elastic breaks uniformly, which means that the probability that the particle, being in state p v , arrives in u, is given by the length of L 1 (which is 1 + cosθ) divided by the length of the total elastic (which is 2). The probability that the particle in state p v arrives in −u is the length of L 2 (which is 1 − cosθ) divided by the length of the total elastic. If we denote these probabilities respectively by P (o u 1 , p v ) and P (o u 2 , p v ) we have:
The probabilities that we find in this way are exactly the quantum probabilities for the spin measurement of a spin 1/2 quantum entity, which means that we can describe this macroscopic machine by the ordinary quantum formalism with a two dimensional complex Hilbert space as the carrier for the set of states of the entity.
Fig. 2 : A representation of the experimental process in the plane where it takes place. The elastic of length 2, corresponding to the experiment eu, is installed between u and −u. The probability, P (o u 1 ,pv), that the particle P ends up in point u is given by the length of the piece of elastic L1 divided by the length of the total elastic. The probability, P (o u 2 ,pv), that the particle P ends up in point −u is given by the length of the piece of elastic L2 divided by the length of the total elastic.
Quantum Structures
Already from the advent of quantum mechanics it was known that the structure of quantum theory is very different from the structure of the earlier existing classical theories. This structural difference has been expressed and studied in different mathematical categories, and we mention here some of the most important ones : (1) if one considers the collection of properties (experimental propositions) of a physical entity, then it has the structure of a Boolean lattice for the case of a classical entity, while it is non-Boolean for the case of a quantum entity (Birkhoff and Von Neumann 1936 , Jauch 1968 , Piron 1976 , (2) for the probability model, it can be shown that for a classical entity it is Kolmogorovian, while for a quantum entity it is not (Foulis and Randall 1972 , Randall and Foulis 1979 , 1983 , Gudder 1988 , Accardi 1982 , Pitovski 1989 , (3) if the collection of observables is considered, a classical entity gives rise to a commutative algebra, while a quantum entity doesn't (Segal 1947 , Emch 1984 .
The presence of these deep structural differences between classical theories and quantum theory has contributed strongly to the already earlier existing belief that classical theories describe the ordinary 'understandable' part of reality, while quantum theory confronts us with a part of reality (the micro-world) that is impossible to understand. Therefore still now there is the strong paradigm that quantum mechanics cannot be understood. The example of our macroscopic machine with a quantum structure challenges this paradigm, because obviously the functioning of this machine can be understood. The aim of this paper is to show that the main part of the quantum structures can indeed be explained in this way and the reason why they appear in nature can be identified. In this paper we shall analyze this explanation, that we have named the 'hidden measurement approach', in the category of the probability models. We refer to , Aerts, Durt, Grib, Van Bogaert and Zapatrin 1993 , Aerts 1994 , Aerts and Durt 1994a for an analysis of this explanation in other categories.
The original development of probability theory was aiming at a formalization of the description of a probability that appears as the consequence of a lack of knowledge. The probability structure appearing in situations of lack of knowledge was axiomatized by Kolmogorov and such a probability model is now called Kolmogorovian. Since the quantum probability model is not Kolmogorovian, it has now generally been accepted that the quantum probabilities are not a description of a lack of knowledge. Sometimes this conclusion is formulated by stating that the quantum probabilities are ontological probabilities, as if they would be present in reality itself. In the hidden measurement approach we show that the quantum probabilities can be explained as being due to a lack of knowledge, and we prove that what distinguishes quantum probabilities from classical Kolmogorovian probabilities is the nature of this lack of knowledge. Let us go back to the quantum machine to illustrate what we mean.
If we consider again our quantum machine ( Fig. 1 and Fig. 2 ), and look for the origin of the probabilities as they appear in this example, we can remark that the probability is entirely due to a lack of knowledge about the measurement process. Namely the lack of knowledge of where exactly the elastic breaks during a measurement. More specifically, we can identify two main aspects of the experiment e u as it appears in the quantum machine.
1. The experiment e u effects a real change on the state p v of the entity S. Indeed, the state p v changes into one of the states p u or p −u by the experiment e u .
2. The probabilities appearing are due to a lack of knowledge about a deeper reality of the individual measurement process itself, namely where the elastic breaks.
These two effects give rise to quantum-like structures. The lack of knowledge about a deeper reality of the individual measurement process we have referred to as the presence of 'hidden measurements' that operate deterministically in this deeper reality (Aerts 1986 (Aerts , 1987 (Aerts , 1991 , and that is the origin of the name that we gave to this approach. A consequence of this explanation is that quantum structures shall turn out to be present in many other regions of reality where the two mentioned effects appear. We think of the many situations in the human sciences, where generally the measurement disturbs profoundly the entity under study, and where almost always a lack of knowledge about the deeper reality of what is going on during this measurement process exists. In the final part of this paper we give some examples of quantum structures appearing in such situations.
3 Quantum, Classical and Intermediate
If the quantum structure can be explained by the presence of a lack of knowledge on the measurement process, we can go a step further, and wonder what types of structure arise when we consider the original models, with a lack of knowledge on the measurement process, and introduce a variation of the magnitude of this lack of knowledge. We have studied the quantum machine under varying 'lack of knowledge', parameterizing this variation by a number ∈ [0, 1], such that = 1 corresponds to the situation of maximal lack of knowledge, giving rise to a quantum structure, and = 0 corresponds to the situation of zero lack of knowledge, generating a classical structure, and other values of correspond to intermediate situations, giving rise to a structure that is neither quantum nor classical Van Bogaert 1992, 1993) . It is this model that we have called the -model, and we want to introduce it again in this paper.
We start from the quantum machine, but introduce now different types of elastic. An , d-elastic consists of three different parts: one lower part where it is unbreakable, a middle part where it breaks uniformly, and an upper part where it is again unbreakable. By means of the two parameters ∈ [0, 1] and d ∈ [−1 + , 1 − ], we fix the sizes of the three parts in the following way. Suppose that we have installed the , d-elastic between the points −u and u of the sphere. Then the elastic is unbreakable in the lower part from −u to (d − ) · u, it breaks uniformly in the part from (d − ) · u to (d + ) · u, and it is again unbreakable in the upper part from (d + ) · u to u (see Fig. 3 ). An e u experiment performed by means of an , d-elastic shall be denoted by e u,d . We have the following cases: (1) v · u ≤ d − . The particle sticks to the lower part of the , d-elastic, and any breaking of the elastic pulls it down to the point −u. We have
The particle falls onto the breakable part of the , d-elastic. We can easily calculate the transition probabilities and find:
The particle falls onto the upper part of the , d-elastic, and any breaking of the elastic pulls it upwards, such that it arrives in u. We have
Probabilities appearing in physical situations
If we want to analyze the structure of the quantum probability model in the light of axioms that have been formulated for classical probability theory, we first have to be very specific about the situation that we consider. In physics (and hence also in quantum mechanics and classical mechanics) we consider a situation where we have a physical entity S that can be in different states p, q, r, ..., and we'll denote the set of states by Σ. On this physical entity S, in a certain state p, we perform experiments e, f, g, ..., that respectively have sets of possible outcomes O e , O f , O g , ....Let us denote the collection of all relevant experiments by E. There are different places in which probability appears in this scheme.
The probability connected to the states
In many occasions it is not possible to prepare the entity S in such a way that we know in which state it is before we start an experiment. We can only prepare it such that we are left with a situation of 'lack of knowledge' about the state of the entity. This situation of lack of knowledge is described by means of a probability measure µ : B(Σ) → [0, 1] on the set of states, such that B(Σ) is a σ-algebra of measurable subsets of Σ, and for K ∈ B(Σ) we have that µ(K) is the probability that the state of the entity S is in the subset K. We have (a) µ(Σ) = 1, and 
The probability connected to the experiments
Even when the entity S is in a state p, and an experiment e is performed, probability, defined as the limit of the relative frequency connected to an outcome o k ∈ O e , appears. For a fixed state p, the probability that an experiment e gives an outcome in a subset A e ⊂ O e , denoted by P (A e , p), can be described as a probability measure on the outcome set O e of the experiment e. Hence a map
is a collection of measurable subsets of O e and (a) P (O e , p) = 1, and
The general probability
Most of the time we measure a probability in the laboratory that contains both just mentioned probabilities. It is the probability that in a situation µ of lack of knowledge on the states, an experiment e gives an outcome in a subset A e ⊂ O e , and we'll denote it by P (A e , µ). This probability is, for a given experiment e, a map P :
is the set of probability measures on Σ.
The eigenstate sets and the possibility-state sets
As we have done in (Aerts 1994) we introduce for an experiment e the eigenstate sets, as maps eig : P(O e ) → P(Σ), where for A e ⊂ O e we have :
We also introduce the possibility-state sets, as maps pos : P(O e ) → P(Σ), where for A e ⊂ O e we have :
Clearly we always have :
Theorem 1 We consider an entity S in a situation with lack of knowledge about the states described by the probability measure µ on the state space. For an arbitrary experiment e and set of outcomes A e ⊂ O e we have:
Proof: As defined we have that µ(eig(A e )) is the probability that the state of the entity is in the subset eig(A e ). If the state is in eig(A e ), the experiment e gives with certainty an outcome in A e , and therefore µ(eig(A e )) ≤ P (A e , µ). As defined we have that µ(pos(A e )) is the probability that the state of the entity is in pos(A e ). If the state is in pos(A e ) the experiment e has a possible outcome in A e , and therefore P (A e , µ) ≤ µ(pos(A e )).
We shall show in the next section that for a classical probability model, the two inequalities become equalities. But first we want to illustrate all these concepts on the quantum machine.
Illustration on the quantum machine
It is easy to see how these concepts are defined for the quantum machine (and also for the -model). For a considered experiment e u (or e u,d in the -model), we have an outcome set O u = {o
The situations with lack of knowledge about the states are described by probability measures on the surface of the sphere. We have also described P (A u , p v ) for an arbitrary A u ⊂ O u (see (3) and (4)). For the eigenstate sets and the possibility-state sets we have (see Fig. 4 .) : We can consider the following specific cases :
The quantum situation ( = 1)
For = 1 we always have d = 0, and the -model reduces to the original quantum machine that we introduced in section 1. It is a model for the spin of a spin 1/2 quantum entity. The transition probabilities are the same as the ones related to the outcomes of a Stern-Gerlach spin experiment on a spin 1/2 quantum particle, of which the quantum-spin-state in direction v = (cosφsinθ, sinφsinθ, cosθ), denoted byψ v , and the experiment e u corresponding to the spin experiment in direction u = (cosβsinα, sinβsinα, cosα), is described respectively by the vector and the self adjoint operator ψ v = (e −iφ/2 cosθ/2, e iφ/2 sinθ/2) (13)
of a two-dimensional complex Hilbert space. For the eigenstate sets and possibilitystate sets we find:
Suppose that we consider a situation with lack of knowledge about the state, described by a uniform probability distribution µ on the sphere, which corresponds to a random distribution of the point on the sphere. Then we can easily calculate the following probabilities :
On the other hand, we have :
which shows that the inequalities of theorem 1 (see (8)) are very strong in this quantum case.
The classical situation ( = 0)
The classical situation is the situation without fluctuations. If = 0, then d can take any value in the interval [−1, +1], and we have:
We again consider the situation of an at random distribution of the point particle on the sphere described by the probability distribution µ. We then have in this case:
On the other hand we have:
which shows that the inequalities of theorem 1 (see (8)) have become equalities in this case.
The general situation
To give a clear picture of the general situation, we introduce additional concepts. First we remark that the regions of eigenstates eig ({o We denote a closed spherical sector centered around the point u ∈ surf with angle θ by sec (u, θ) , and a open spherical sector with the same angle by sec o (u, θ). We call λ d the angle of the spherical sectors corresponding to eig ({o u 1 }) for all u, hence for 0 = we have eig ({o Fig. 5 ). We can verify easily that eig ({o u 2 }) is determined by a spherical sector centered around the point −u. We call µ d the angle of this spherical sector, hence for 0 = we have eig ({o
For 0 = we have pos ({o
We have:
6 The classical situation
We want to formulate now the classical situation in this general scheme. We shall see that in the characterization of a classical probability model, the inequalities of theorem 1 play an important role.
Definition 1 Suppose that we are in the situation µ of lack of knowledge on the states. We say that an experiment e is a 'classical experiment' iff µ(eig(A e )) = µ(pos(A e )) for all subsets A e ⊂ O e . With other words, a classical experiment is an experiment where all states, except a collection of measure zero, give rise to predetermined outcomes for this experiment.
Classical experiments are experiments with predetermined outcomes (except for a set of states of measure zero that as a consequence do not contribute to the statistics). For these classical experiments we can show that probability always originates in a lack of knowledge on the states.
Theorem 2 If we are in the situation µ of lack of knowledge on the states, and e is a classical experiment, then for each A e ∈ B(O e ) we have :
Proof: A direct consequence of definition 1 and theorem 1. We shall show now that for classical experiments Bayes formula for the conditional probability is valid. To be able to analyze the validity of Bayes formula in the scheme that we have presented here, we must give an operational definition for the concept of conditional probability. Here we are confronted with a conceptual problem, since in most textbooks, the conditional probability is defined by means of Bayes formula. Since the conditional probability is a primary physical quantity that is measured in the laboratory, we should define it operationally and without the use of Bayes formula.
The concept of conditional probability
We want to make clear that there is a distinction between the occurrence of an outcome when an experiment is performed, and the conditioning on an outcome corresponding to an experiment.
Definition 2 Given a situation µ of lack of knowledge on the states of an entity S, described by a probability measure on this set of states Σ. We condition the entity S on a subset A f ⊂ O f for an experiment f , if we consider during the performance of the experiment e only those trials, where the situation of the entity before the experiment e is such that we can predict the outcome for the experiment f to occur with certainty in A f , if we would decide to perform the experiment f .
From this definition follows that conditioning is equivalent to a change of the situation µ before the experiment in such a way that the experiment f would give with certainty an outcome in A f , if it would be executed. The new situation of lack of knowledge is described by the probability measure that we shall denote by µ A f : B(Σ) → [0, 1]. It is defined for an arbitrary subset K ⊂ Σ as follows :
Now that we have introduced this concept of 'conditioning' on an experiment, we can introduce the general concept of conditional probability.
Definition 3 Given a situation µ of lack of knowledge on the states of an entity, described by the probability measure µ, and given two experiments e and f , then we want to consider the conditional probability P (A e , A f , µ). This is the probability that the experiment e makes occur an outcome in the set A e , when the situation is conditioned on the set A f for the experiment f . The conditional probability is a map P :
Theorem 3 Given a situation µ of lack of knowledge on the states, and two experiments e and f . If the experiment e is a classical experiment, then the conditional probability P (A e , A f , µ) satisfies Bayes formula. More specifically we have P (A e , A f , µ) = µ(eig(A e ) ∩ eig(A f ))/µ(eig(A f )).
Proof:
We have (see 37) that P (A e , A f , µ) = P (A e , µ A f ). If e is a classical experiment it follows from theorem 2 that P (A e , µ A f ) = µ A f (eig(A e )) = µ(eig(A e ) ∩ eig(A f ))/µ(eig(A f )). This shows that Bayes formula is valid.
From this theorem can intuitively be seen that Bayes formula for the conditional probability shall not be valid for the case of two experiments that are both nonclassical. We shall now analyze all these situations in the -model and show how the conditional probability in the -model evolves continuously from the quantum transition probability, for the case of = 1, to a classical Kolmogorovian probability satisfying Bayes formula, for the case = 0. We shall also show that for values of strictly between 1 and 0, the conditional probability is neither quantum nor classical.
The conditional probability and the -model
Given a situation µ of lack of knowledge about the state of the point particle, described by a uniform probability measure on the sphere. This corresponds to the situation where the particle P is distributed at random on the sphere. For a fixed , and two parameters d and c both in the interval [−1 + , 1 − ], there are also given the two experiments e u,d and e w,c .
u -u w -w Fig. 6 : An illustration of the situation corresponding to the conditional probability for the -model. The lack of knowledge about the state of the particle is described by a uniform probability distribution µ on the sphere. For a fixed and two parameters d and c in the the interval [−1+ ,1− ], we consider two experiments e u,d and e w,c . We want to calculate the conditional probability P (u,w,µ) that the experiment e u,d gives the outcome o u 1 , when the entity is conditioned on the outcome o w 1 for the experiment e w,c . This means that before the start of the experiment e u,d , the situation is such that if we would perform the experiment e w,c , the outcome o w 1 would come out with certainty. This conditioning is expressed by a new probability measure on the sphere, which is zero outside the grey area, and equal to the old one, except for a renormalization factor, in the grey area.
In general we consider the conditional probability for arbitrary elements of the set of measurable subsets of the outcome sets of the two experiments. Since in the -model we only have experiments e u,d , with two outcomes o u 1 and o u 2 , we want to alleviate somewhat the notation. Therefore we shall denote the conditional probability that the experiment e u,d gives the outcome o u 1 (respectively o u 2 ), when the entity is conditioned for the outcome o w 1 of the experiment e w,c by P (u, w, µ) (respectively P (−u, w, µ)). In a similar way we denote the conditional probability that the experiment e u,d gives the outcome o u 1 (respectively o u 2 ), when the entity is conditioned for the outcome o w 2 of the experiment e w,c by P (u, −w, µ) (respectively P (−u, −w, µ)) (see Fig. 6 ). We repeat again: the conditional probability P (u, w, µ) is the probability that the experiment e u,d gives the outcome o u 1 , if the entity is conditioned on the outcome o w 1 for the experiment e w,c . This means that the lack of knowledge on the states is such that if we would decide to perform the experiment e w,c , the outcome o w 1 would come out with certainty. With other words (see Fig. 6 ), the state of the entity is such that the particle is distributed uniformly inside the spherical sector eig({o w 1 }), the grey area on Figure 6 . It is easy to formulate in a similar way the four other conditional probabilities P (−u, w, µ), P (u, −w, µ) and P (−u, −w, µ). The explicit calculation of these conditional probabilities is a long exercise of classical calculus, and therefore we refer to (Aerts D. and Aerts S. 1994 b) for a detailed exposition of this calculation. Here we only give the result. Let us call α the angle between the two vectors u and w, then we have:
where H(x) is the function of Heaviside, and :
where :
and :
Let us first consider the two extremal cases, the classical case, where = 0, and the quantum case, where = 1.
(1) the classical case ( = 0)
In this case we find :
which is a linear function in the angle.
(2) the quantum case ( = 1)
For this case we only have to take into account the contribution p 1 of (38), and hence we find :
which is the well known quantum transition probability between the states p u and p w .
The conditional probability P (u, w, µ) evolves continuously from the quantum transition probability between the states p u and p w to a linear function of the angle between the two vectors u and w.
An intermediate situation of the -model that is neither classical nor quantum
A complete probabilistic analysis of the intermediate situation of the -model is presented in (Aerts D. and Aerts S. 1994 b) . Here we only show that for a specific value of = √ 2 2 the conditional probabilities of the -model cannot be fitted neither into a quantum probability model nor into a classical probability model.
2 , the conditional probabilities of the -model cannot be fitted neither into a classical nor into a quantum probability model.
Proof :
We shall give a proof ex absurdum, and suppose that there does exist a Kolmogorovian model satisfying Bayes formula for the conditional probability for this value of . We consider three experiments e u,d , e v,d and e w,d , such that d = 0 and u, v and w are in the same plane, with an angle of 2π 3 between u and v, between v and w, and between w and u. If we use the general expression for the conditional probability (38) we find P (v, w, µ) = 0.78, P (u, w, µ) = 0.22 and P (−u, v, µ) = 0.22. As we have defined, P (v, w, µ) is the probability that the experiment e v,d gives the outcome o v 1 , if we have conditioned the entity in such a way that if we would perform the experiment e w,d , it would give with certainty an outcome o w 1 . To be able to express more clearly the hypothesis of the existence of a Kolmogorovian probability model, we write these conditional probabilities in a more standard notation. Hence
) under the preparation µ. If there does exist a Kolmogorovian probability model, satisfying the Bayes formula, there exists a set X (playing the role of the sample space), and a σ-algebra B(X) (playing the role of the set of events), and a probability measure ν :
) can be written under the appropriate form. This means that there exists elements U, V, W ∈ B(X) such that :
We also have
Using the fact that ν is a probability measure, and (47) and (48), and substituting the values of the conditional probabilities, we get:
If we subtract (52) from (50) we find :
which implies that 0.28
On the other hand from (54) follows
The inequalities (56) and (57) deliver us the contradiction that we were looking for. The conclusion is that for these values of the conditional probabilities there does not exists a Kolmogorovian probability model satisfying the Bayes formula. Also for the proof of the non-existence of a Hilbertian model we proceed ex absurdum. If there exists a two dimensional complex Hilbert space model, where the conditional probabilities are described by the transition probabilities, we can find three orthonormal basis {φ 1 , φ 2 }, {ψ 1 , ψ 2 }, {χ 1 , χ 2 } such that:
This means that there exists five angles θ 1 , θ 2 , θ 3 , θ 4 and θ 5 such that:
If {φ 1 , φ 2 } is an orthonormal basis, we have χ 1 , ψ 2 = χ 1 , φ 1 φ 1 , ψ 2 + χ 1 , φ 2 φ 2 , ψ 2 , and hence
and also the complex conjugate
If we multiply these last equations term by term we find :
This we can write as
But then we must have
If we fill in the values δ 2 = 0.22 and γ 2 = 0.78 we find :
From this contradiction we can conclude that there does not exist a two dimensional Hilbert space model, such that the conditional probabilities can be described by transition probabilities in this Hilbert space. This theorem shows that we really have identified a new region of probabilistic structure in this intermediate domain. In (Aerts D. and Aerts S. 1994 b) we show that for any value of different from 0, the probability structure of the -model is non Kolmogorovian (not satisfying Bayes formula for the conditional probabilities). We also show that there is a domain of = 1 where a Hilbert space model can be found, but another domain where this is not the case.
We come now to the last section of this paper, where we like to give a sketch of how these non-Kolmogorovian probabilities appear in other regions of nature.
10 Non-Kolmogorovian probabilities in other regions of nature
As follows from the foregoing analysis, non-classical experiments, giving rise to a non-classical structure, are characterized by the presence of non-predetermined outcomes. This makes it rather easy to recognize the non-classical aspects of experiments in other regions of reality. Let us consider the situation of a decision process developing in the mind of a human being, and we refer to (Aerts D. and Aerts. S. 1994 a, b) for a more detailed description. Hence our entity is a person, its states being the possible 'states' of this person. Experiments are questions that can be asked to the person, and on which she or he has to respond with 'yes' or 'no'. The typical situation of an opinion poll can be thought of as a concrete example. Let us consider three different questions :
1. u : Are you in favor of the use of nuclear energy?
2. v : Do you think it would be a good idea to legalize soft-drugs?
3. w : Do you think capitalism is better than social-democracy?
We have chosen such type of questions that many persons shall not have predetermined opinions about them. Since the person has to respond with 'yes' or 'no', she or he, without opinion before the questioning, shall 'form' her or his opinion during this process of questioning. We can use the -model to represent this situation. To simplify the situation, but without touching the essence, we make the following assumptions about the probabilities that are involved. We suppose that in all cases 50% of the persons have answered the question u with 'yes', but only 15% of the persons had a predetermined opinion. This means that 70% of the persons formed their answer during the process of questioning. For simplicity we make the same assumptions for v and w. We can represent this situation in the -model as shown in Figure 7 . We also make some assumptions of the way in which the different opinions related to the three questions influence each other. We can represent an example of a possible interaction by means of the -model ( Figure 9 ). One can see how a person can be a strong proponent for the use of nuclear energy, while having no predetermined opinion about the legalization of soft drugs (area 1 in Figure 9 ). Area (4) corresponds to a sample of persons that have predetermined opinion in favor of legalization of soft drugs and in favor of capitalism. For area (10) we have persons that have predetermined opinion against the legalization of soft drugs and against capitalism. All the 13 areas of Figure 9 can be described in such a simple way. 2 . This means that we can apply theorem 4, and conclude that the collection of conditional probabilities corresponding to these questions u, v and w can neither be fitted into a Kolmogorovian probability model nor into a quantum probability model. We are developing now in Brussels a statistics for such new situations, that we have called 'interactive statistics'. By means of this statistics it should be possible to make models for situations where part of the properties to be tested are created during the process of testing.
Conclusion
The further development of an intermediate (between classical and quantum) probability theory and an interactive statistics could be very fruitful as well for physics as for other sciences.
We work now at the construction of a general theory, where also the intermediate structures can be incoorporated (Aerts 1986 , Aerts 1987 , Aerts 1994 , Aerts and Durt 1994a , 1994b , Coecke 1994a , 1994b , 1994c . This theory can probably be used to describe the region of reality between microscopic and macroscopic, often referred to as the mesoscopic region. Actually, physicists use a very complicated heuristic mixture of quantum and classical theories to construct models for mesoscopic entities. There is however no consistent theory, and a general intermediate theory could perhaps fill this gap. We try to find examples of simple physical phenomena in the mesoscopic region that could eventually be modeled by an -like model (Aerts and Durt 1994 b) . If we succeed in building this intermediate theory, we would not only have a new theory for the mesoscopic region, but the existence of such a theory would also shed light on old problems of quantum mechanics (the quantum classical relation, the classical limit, the measurement problem, etc...). In Till now we have only been developing the kinematics of this intermediate theory (Aerts 1994 and , but, once the kinematics is fully developed, the way to construct a dynamics for the intermediate region is straightforward. We can study the imprimitivity system related to the Galilei group and look for representations of this Galilei group in the group of automorphisms of the kinematical structure of the intermediate theory. If we can derive an evolution equation in this way, it should continuously transform with varying from the Schrödinger equation ( = 1), to the Hamilton equations ( = 0).
As we have shown in the last section of this paper, the development of an interactive statistics could be of great importance for the human sciences, where often non-predetermined outcome situations appear. It could lead to a new methodology for these sciences. Actually one is aware of the problem of the interaction between subject and object, but it is generally thought that this problems cannot be taken into account in the theory.
We also want to remark that the 'hidden measurement approach' defines a new quantization procedure. Starting from a classical mechanical entity, and adding 'lack of knowledge (or fluctuations)' on the measurement process, out of the classical entity appears a quantum-like entity. Another problem that we are investigating at this moment is an attempt to describe quantum chaos by means of this new quantization procedure. It can be shown that the sensitive dependence on the initial conditions that can be found in the -model for the classical situation in the set of unstable equilibrium states disappears when the fluctuations on the measurement process increase. This could be the explanation for the absence of quantum chaos.
